

Mark scheme

International Advanced
Level in History (WHI04/1D)

Paper 4: International Study with
Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot
War in Asia, 1945–90

Generic Level Descriptors for Paper 4

Section A

Target: A01 (5 marks): Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

A03 (20 marks): Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included and presented as information, rather than being linked with the extracts. • Judgement on the view is assertive, with little supporting evidence.
2	5–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. • Mostly accurate knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth. It is added to information from the extracts, but mainly to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. • A judgement on the view is given with limited support, but the criteria for judgement are left implicit.
3	9–14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates understanding and some analysis of the extracts by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences. • Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and discussion of the extracts is attempted. A judgement is given, although with limited substantiation, and is related to some key points of view in the extracts.
4	15–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by a comparison of them. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to explore most of the relevant aspects of the debate, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge. • Valid criteria by which the view can be judged are established and applied and the evidence provided in the extracts discussed in the process of coming to a substantiated overall judgement, although treatment of the extracts may be uneven. Demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
5	21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors.• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to explore fully the matter under debate. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments.• A sustained evaluative argument is presented, applying valid criteria and reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.

Section B

Target: AO1 (25 marks): Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	5–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is some analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited support and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	9–14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although some mainly descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence or precision.
4	15–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence or precision.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
5	21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis and discussion of the relationships between key features of the period.• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands.• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement.• The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.

Section A: indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

Question	Indicative content
1	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material that is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected.</p> <p>Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that Truman's decision to intervene in Korea in June 1950 was a spontaneous response to an unexpected invasion. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <p>Extract 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President Truman was spending the weekend with his family away from Washington. • The situation in Korean had seemed to be stabilising. • Truman decided to support South Korea on the plane back to Washington. • Stalin used this as a test case and expected to get away with the attack. <p>Extract 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Truman needed a crisis to prove his anti-communism and support containment. • The US headquarters in Tokyo claimed that they were surprised but military intelligence had specific information with regard to an attack from North Korea. • The US had already prepared a condemnation to submit to the UN and Truman was ready to send supplies to South Korea within hours. <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that Truman's decision to intervene in Korea in June 1950 was a spontaneous response to an unexpected invasion. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The North Korean army of 135,000 men invaded without warning and took the South Korean capital within days. • Korea was not considered a Cold War 'hotspot' in 1950; neither the US nor the USSR were actively supporting the unification objectives of their respective client states. • Truman was genuinely shocked by an invasion that he perceived to be equivalent to events in Europe in the 1930s and it took several days to formulate a response. • The Truman administration failed to appreciate the extent to which an apparent decrease in the US commitment to South Korea in early 1950 encouraged Soviet ambitions.

Question	Indicative content
	<p>Candidates should relate their knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that Truman's decision to intervene in Korea in June 1950 was a spontaneous response to an unexpected invasion. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By 1950 a resurgence of Cold War politics had occurred due to Soviet nuclear weapons testing and Truman was aware that 're-unification' was a policy goal of the North Koreans • Truman may have been seeking to implement the changes to foreign policy suggested by US National Security Council policy paper 68; this advocated an 'immediate and large scale build-up of military strength' • Truman had been blamed by many in America for the 'loss' of China and he needed to show he was 'tough' on communism to help the Democrats win seats in the November 1950 US Congressional elections • Washington knew that the Soviet Union was refusing to attend UN Security Council meetings and so could guarantee UN condemnation and support • MacArthur in Tokyo was determined to support a strong US stance in Asia and his intelligence officials fed Washington with reports of prospective aggression.

Section B: indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

Question	Indicative content
2	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material that is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the suggestion that the decisions made at the Geneva Conference were responsible for the growing US involvement in South East Asia in the years 1954–63.</p> <p>The role of the decisions made at the Geneva Conference in the growing US involvement in South East Asia in the years 1954–63 should be analysed and evaluated: Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The decisions collectively failed to create regional stability so drawing the US further into South East Asia • The division of Vietnam encouraged the US to support Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam; his unpopular regime forced both Eisenhower and Kennedy to provide increasing levels of economic and military support • The failure to hold the agreed unified elections in 1956 encouraged Viet Minh activity in the south; the US countered with increasing numbers of military advisers • The granting of independence and/or self-government to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam encouraged US involvement across the region as part of its anti-communist policy of containment. <p>The role of other factors in the growing US involvement in South East Asia in the years 1954–63 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cold War developments post the Second World War influenced US belief in the 'domino theory' and the policy of containment in Asia, as seen in the US creation of SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) • The presence of communist China encouraged US influence in the region – the US did not want another Korea • Anti-communist influences in American domestic politics demanded that Presidents take a tough stance against communism, particularly Democrats such as Kennedy • Specific events influenced US policy, for example Johnson's escalation of military support following the assassinations of both Diem and Kennedy in late 1963 • President Kennedy, in contrast to Eisenhower, was determined to be a 'Cold War warrior' and his policies escalated the American presence in Vietnam.

Question	Indicative content
3	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material that is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on significance of US President Nixon's decision to begin the bombing of Cambodia in 1969 to the rise of the Khmer Rouge in the years 1965–75.</p> <p>The contribution of President Nixon's decision to begin the bombing of Cambodia in 1969 to the rise of the Khmer Rouge in the years 1965–75 should be analysed and evaluated: Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The bombing began a chain reaction of events each of which pushed Cambodians towards support for the Khmer Rouge • The bombing undermined the government of Prince Sihanouk leading to a coup d'état by Lon Nol and a civil war; Prince Sihanouk and his supporters began to back the Khmer Rouge • North Vietnamese communists hiding in Cambodia were forced deeper into the country and encouraged more people to join the Khmer Rouge • The bombing campaign, given the name Operation Menu, was designed to destroy agricultural production and drove the rural population towards the ruraly based Khmer insurgents • The ferocity and 'illegitimacy' of the bombing campaign fuelled a Khmer Rouge propaganda campaign. <p>To establish extent, evidence limiting the significance of the bombing and/or supporting other significant factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Khmer Rouge, although small, was already a presence in the countryside and was working to destabilise Cambodia • Prince Sihanouk had been responsible for inviting the North Vietnamese into Cambodia from 1965, increasing exposure to communist ideas • Prince Sihanouk actively encouraged his followers to work with the Khmer Rouge after he was deposed, so broadening their support base • It was the public invasion and blanket bombing of Cambodia by the US from April 1970, rather than the secret bombing in 1969, that increased support • The unpopularity of Lon Nol's regime and his use of US military aid against political opposition further encouraged Cambodians to join the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s • US bombing in Cambodia ended in 1973 but it was not until 1975 that the Khmer Rouge finally succeeded in taking Phnom Penh.